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The Balkans and the Black Sea
Region: Problems, Potentials,
and Policy Options
Summary
In the decade and a half since Western leaders began to sketch out their vision of
a Europe whole and free, the European Union and NATO have succeeded in
extending a zone of security and stability across much of the continent. However,
two key regions – the Balkans and the Black Sea – are not yet fully incorporated
into this vision, and the lack of coherent strategies addressing these regions threat-
ens to prevent Europe from achieving its full potential.
The Balkans and the Black Sea region are characterised by numerous common risks
and challenges, including fragile statehood, a shared history of violent conflict,
unconsolidated democratisation and economic underdevelopment. Given the cru-
cial geopolitical position of both regions as (a) direct neighbours to the EU, NATO,
and Russia, (b) a bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia, and (c) an increasing-
ly important energy transport route, instability in either region can have significant
ramifications for domestic, regional, and international security.
External actors have developed different policies for the two respective regions. The
Western Balkans are on a path toward European integration, albeit with an unclear
plan and timetable. The European Union has introduced the European Neighbour-
hood Policy as a means to prevent new dividing lines within Europe; this policy is
directed toward all non-candidate countries in the Black Sea, although its scope is
primarily bilateral rather than regional in nature. Russia, pursuing a strategy that
combines personalised networks and economic pressure, has yet to develop an
attractive policy to promote cooperation in its immediate neighbourhood.
Given the internal challenges and external linkages of the Balkans and Black Sea
region, three strategic trajectories for addressing these regions present themselves.
Given the diverse and often opposing interests of the various actors involved, busi-
ness as usual may be the most likely policy outcome. This carries with it numerous
risks, however. A more proactive policy that seeks to shape, rather than simply
react to, events in both regions would involve intensified engagement, including
(a) a clearly formulated plan and timetable for the accession of Western Balkan
states into the EU and (b) a more comprehensive policy to address the security,
economic, and political needs of the Black Sea region. While intensified engagement
represents a desirable policy orientation toward the current challenges in the
Balkans and the Black Sea, European leaders and their allies must continue to keep
an eye on longer-term processes of Europe-wide integration by engaging in a pan-
European debate on Europe’s future.
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1. Introduction
In the decade and a half since Western leaders began to sketch out their vision of a
Europe whole and free, as well as the means to achieve this vision, many pieces of
the puzzle have been put into place. Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly NATO,
and wholly European institutions, above all the European Union, have extended the
zone of security and stability across much of the continent. Once confined to six
countries between the Pyrenees and the River Elbe, the European Union now
embraces 25 members from the Atlantic to the Aegean, and from the Arctic Circle
to Africa’s shores. In 2004, the Union took in 10 new members in its most ambitious
enlargement ever, and its members are working to ensure that its institutions will
function even if a dozen or more additional states eventually join the existing mem-
bers. Russia and the United States – powers that are of Europe but not completely
in Europe – have both been constructively engaged in these processes. This enga-
gement has helped ensure that, by and large, Russia and the United States view
European integration not as a threat but rather as a necessary and desirable devel-
opment in light of shifting global interests and strategic considerations.
However, this vision of Europe is not yet complete. Two regions are not sketched in
as clearly as the rest, and the lack of a coherent strategic framework threatens to per-
petuate instability in these regions, thereby preventing Europe from achieving its full
potential. The Balkans and the Black Sea region represent the key strategic gaps in
the vision of Europe.These regions are characterised by economic and political insta-
bility, shared experiences of violent conflict, and states that struggle to fulfil their
core functions. At the same time, these regions have taken significant strides toward
Europe, most dramatically in the recent “rainbow revolutions” in Georgia and
Ukraine. But the benefits that Europe could reap from these positive developments
remain unconsolidated; in the absence of sustained domestic reforms and external
support, these bright elements of the picture could fade to grey.
In the Balkans, the broad contours of the picture are clear: the states in this region
are on a path toward membership in the European Union. However, at a time
when the EU’s internal struggles threaten to postpone future rounds of enlarge-
ment indefinitely, it is important to underscore the dynamic linkage between
deepening and widening as complementary components of European integration.
It is time to get down to the hard work of negotiating precisely how and when the
Balkans will join the EU, what domestic reforms must be implemented to achieve
membership, and what external actors can do to reinforce this process. Now is also
the time to strengthen the political will among current member states to continue
the enlargement process and to ensure that the Union’s institutions are capable of
effectively absorbing the Balkan states once they fulfil the criteria for membership.
The situation is different in the Black Sea region. While several Black Sea states are
also on the path toward EU membership, a relatively weak sense of regional iden-
tity and a multiplicity of external policies directed toward the region have led to
less certainty regarding the international institutional frameworks in which the
Black Sea will ultimately be anchored. Several Black Sea states struggle with prob-
lems of separatism and potential state failure. Local leaders with weak democratic
credentials frequently depict democracy, market economies, and human rights as
foreign intrusions, and the notion that the region’s future lies in Europe is more
contested than in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the recent wave of democratisation,
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together with recent efforts to forge stronger regional linkages, have given
momentum to domestic supporters of integration within Euro-Atlantic structures,
and the failure to engage constructively with these new aspirants could have
unforeseen consequences for Europe. Furthermore, the Black Sea region plays an
increasingly critical role in Europe’s energy security. As a result, European self-
interest demands a clearer delineation of the region’s position in Europe.
This paper takes a closer look at the institutional and strategic dynamics affecting
the Balkans and the Black Sea. First, it examines the main risks confronting region-
al and international actors and provides detailed portraits of a few exemplary chal-
lenges. Second, it explores the roles and policies of key external actors in both
regions. Finally, it outlines various strategic options and suggests how these
regions can be incorporated into the vision of a Europe whole and free.
2. Risks and Challenges beyond the Borders of the Euro-Atlantic Community
The Balkans and the Black Sea region occupy a geographic area that is not only the
immediate neighbourhood of the European Union, NATO, and Russia, but also
embodies a bridge to the critical regions of Central Asia and the Middle East. As a
result, the geopolitical significance of the Balkans and the Black Sea region can
hardly be overestimated. In an age when economies, security risks, and ideological
and political movements are increasingly transnational in nature, achieving stabil-
ity in these regions is essential for the maintenance of international security. While
both regions have made important progress in recent years, they still confront a
number of common risks and challenges, including state reconstruction and/or
consolidation, conflict resolution, democratization, economic underdevelopment,
and energy security. Each of these challenges not only affects domestic and region-
al stability but also has important international ramifications.
Fragile States Struggling toward Democratisation and Western Institutions
In recent years, the issue of state failure has gained increasing prominence on the
international security agenda, as fragile states are considered a breeding ground
for security risks such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, organised crime, violent conflict, and pandemic diseases. The core functions
of states encompass the provision of external and internal security, effective gover-
nance, and basic standards of social and economic welfare. Fragile states are those
that are unable or unwilling to exercise control over their territories, guarantee the
security of their citizens, establish effective institutions for political participation
and the rule of law, and provide essential public goods such as education, health
care, and the structural foundations for economic growth. In light of this descrip-
tion, it is clear that nearly all states in the Balkans and Black Sea region can be
characterised as fragile to a greater or lesser degree.
The problem of fragile statehood is most acute in parts of the Black Sea region,
particularly in Moldova and the states of the South Caucasus, where weak and/or
autocratic governance and rampant poverty are accompanied by festering conflicts
and threats to territorial integrity. Even in those Black Sea states where direct 
threats to territorial integrity are absent, such as Ukraine, unconsolidated demo-
cratic structures and economic underdevelopment present an ongoing threat to
social and political stability. In the Western Balkans, the prospect of European inte-
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gration has served to significantly diminish security risks, yet these states continue
to suffer from weak indigenous institutions that lack the capacity to fulfil essential
political, economic, and social functions, while potentially destabilising domestic
and regional ethnic tensions simmer just below the surface. Throughout both
regions, inadequate rule of law mechanisms allow corruption and organised crime
to flourish. In short, all states in the Balkans and Black Sea region are transitional
states where political and economic transformations – and in some cases funda-
mental questions of national security – remain unresolved and incomplete.
Seen from another perspective, however, the glass may be nearer to half full. Both
the Balkans and the Black Sea region have made progress toward the establish-
ment of democratic and market-oriented institutions, and their prospects for
inclusion in Euro-Atlantic institutions have grown. With their eyes set on joining
the EU in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria have made significant advances in imple-
menting political and economic reform programs. Similarly, Turkey has engaged in
sustained reforms that encompass democratisation, improved civil-military rela-
tions, economic stabilisation, and improved relations between the Kurdish popu-
lation and the central government. All three countries are already members of
NATO. Apart from unsettled statehood issues concerning Montenegro and
Kosovo, the Western Balkans have – at varying speeds – continued to solidify state
structures and shift their attention toward fulfilling the criteria for EU membership.
The new, albeit still consolidating, democracies in Georgia and Ukraine have re-
peatedly underscored their interest in cooperating more intensively with NATO
and the EU, and other countries such as Moldova and Armenia have declared their
interest in strengthening ties with the EU, NATO, and the OSCE.
While they have moved forward toward democracy and market economies, the
states in the Balkans and the Black Sea region do not yet meet the benchmarks of
regional identity and cooperation that are essential for promoting security and
stability. Regional cooperation faces obstacles because the necessary precondition
–  such as settling conflicts and statehood questions, expanding economic ties, and
improving regional infrastructure – have not yet been fulfilled. In the Balkans,
national groups have tended to reject their “Balkan” identity due to the term’s
negative connotations and focused on creating a “Southeast European” identity.
Regional identity in the Black Sea states is even less developed and has only
recently gained dynamism.
Western leaders have emphasised the necessity of regional cooperation in the
Balkans as a precondition for joining Euro-Atlantic institutions, but they have paid
insufficient attention to the development of regional identity in the Black Sea
despite several important examples of “bottom-up”approaches toward regionalism
initiated by Black Sea actors. First, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC),
established in 1992 to promote trade and economic integration among Black Sea
states, has recently expanded its fields of activity beyond economic cooperation to
tackle issues such as organised crime, transport networks, and security. Second,
the Community of Democratic Choice was established in December 2005, largely
upon the initiative of Ukrainian and Georgian presidents Viktor Yushchenko and
Mikhail Saakashvili. Comprised of nine countries from the Balkan, Baltic, and
Black Sea regions, with observers from the United States and the European Union,
the CDC focuses on the promotion of democratic values, regional stability, and
economic prosperity. Third, Romania and Bulgaria have become increasingly asser-
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tive in promoting regional integration in the Black Sea, and they promise to carry
this foreign policy interest into the EU once they become members.
These locally-driven attempts to foster regional collaboration possess considerable
potential for strengthening the linkages between Western institutions and the
Black Sea region, thereby creating momentum for the elaboration of more com-
prehensive Euro-Atlantic strategies directed toward this region.
Frozen Conflicts and the Threat of Violent Escalation
The processes by which new states emerged in the Balkans and Black Sea region
have been influenced by historical burdens, ethnic tensions, and territorial dis-
agreements. As a result, the sovereignty of some of these states remained in dis-
pute even after they achieved independence and international recognition. In the
most severe cases, unresolved disputes over claims to statehood escalated into vio-
lent conflicts.
Both regions share a legacy of violent conflict since the end of the Cold War. The
conflicts on the Balkans – including the war in Bosnia from 1992-1995, the conflict
in Kosovo that led to NATO’s military intervention in 1999, and intermittent eth-
nic conflicts in Macedonia that resulted in the 2001 Ohrid Agreement – left an
indelible impression on Euro-Atlantic institutions and played a crucial role in
heightening NATO’s and particularly the EU’s attention toward promoting securi-
ty and development in the direct neighbourhood of both institutions.
As conflicts on the Balkans recede into the past and security questions give way to
more quotidian efforts to join the EU, the main open conflict-related question in
the region concerns the future status of Kosovo. Negotiations on final status com-
menced on 20 February 2006, and the Contact Group overseeing international
policy in Kosovo (the U.S., U.K., Russia, Germany, France, and Italy) has sought to
minimise the potential for renewed conflict by insisting that there should be no
return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union
of Kosovo with any other country. Most analysts agree that status talks will lead to
some form of “conditional independence” for Kosovo, involving ongoing supervi-
sion by international civilian and military forces, decentralisation of government,
and international monitoring of minority rights protection for Kosovo Serbs and
other minorities. A peaceful resolution of the Kosovo status question, supplement-
ed by an effective mix of international carrots and sticks for both Kosovo and
Serbia and Montenegro, will be critical for fostering long-term stability in the
Balkans.
While the Balkan conflicts have garnered far more international attention than
those in the Black Sea region, it is these latter conflicts that remain unresolved and
possess more potential to reignite. For example, despite recent hopes for a break-
through in negotiations, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remain
fraught with tension over the unsettled conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, where
armed conflict lasted from 1990-1994. Georgia continues to grapple with
secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and nearly 18 percent of
Georgian territory remains beyond the control of authorities in Tbilisi. Russia is
entangled in the long-running conflict in Chechnya, and the North Caucasus on
the whole remains a hotbed of separatist movements and ethnic conflict that
The role of external actors
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threaten stability in the Russian Federation and throughout the region. Finally, the
unresolved conflict over the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic continues to
threaten the territorial integrity of Moldova.
The international community has sought to contribute to conflict resolution in the
Black Sea region. The OSCE plays a central role in mediating efforts to settle the
Transnistrian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The EU’s role has gradually
increased, particularly through the appointment of Special Representatives to both
the South Caucasus and Moldova. Russia’s role remains less transparent as it has
served to both foment and stabilise these conflicts at different points in time.
Despite these international efforts, however, the Black Sea conflicts remain 
“frozen”– neither active nor resolved – and thereby continually threaten to reesca-
late into hot violence. Areas rendered lawless by violent conflict can provide safe
havens to terrorist groupings, allow organised crime to flourish, and inhibit the
domestic and foreign investment necessary for economic growth, thereby leaving
entire countries and regions unstable. As a result, the durable, peaceful settlement
of conflicts in both the Balkans and the Black Sea region is a central factor for pro-
moting stability in the Euro-Atlantic community’s immediate neighbourhood.
Securing Future Energy Supplies
An additional strategic challenge that specifically affects the Black Sea region
involves the security of energy supplies. Given the Euro-Atlantic community’s
concern with (a) the threat of terrorism in the Middle East, (b) increasing compe-
tition for energy resources from rapidly growing economies in China and India,
and (c) recent interruptions in the delivery of Russian energy supplies to Europe,
Western countries are urgently seeking to diversify their supplies of energy. As a
result, the Black Sea region is set to become a pivotal conduit for non-OPEC, non-
Persian Gulf, and non-Russian oil and natural gas flowing from the Caspian Sea
and Central Asia to western markets. While the United States has long been
involved in projects to secure energy via the Black Sea region, the EU is now begin-
ning to realise the importance of developing an external energy strategy that incor-
porates a stronger focus on transport corridors involving Black Sea states: an EU
Green Paper on Energy was issued on 8 March 2006 that contained statements
confirming this objective.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan via
Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea, was officially opened in May 2005.
Further extensions of the pipeline involving the transport of oil and natural gas
from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are either under construction or in discussion.
Additional pipeline projects have been proposed that would involve energy trans-
port via Black Sea and Balkan states as diverse as Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine,
Macedonia, and Albania.
The growing importance of the Black Sea region as an energy supply route has
numerous ramifications. First, revenues that accrue from pipeline projects, if
managed in a transparent and accountable manner, can spur economic develop-
ment and cooperation in the Caucasus and throughout the Black Sea region.
Second, if certain pipelines under consideration ultimately involve transport via
the Balkans, Black Sea energy projects may promote economic cooperation and
much-needed foreign investments in the Balkans as well. Third, given their objec-
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tive of achieving diversified and reliable energy supplies, the United States and the
European Union have every interest in promoting stable, democratic governments
in both regions. Finally, due to Russia’s central role as a supplier of energy to Black
Sea and EU states, it will be of critical importance for the Euro-Atlantic communi-
ty to develop energy strategies that maximise cooperation with Russia.
These domestic, regional, and international challenges – of state consolidation,
conflict resolution, democratic and market-oriented reforms, and the need for
secure energy supplies – are common to both the Balkans and Black Sea region.
Achieving durable security and development in these regions will require sustain-
ed engagement by not only domestic but also international actors. The following
section explores key international policies that have been addressed toward these
regions.
3. Linkages and External Actors
With its enlargement in 2004, the European Union finally overcame the division of
the continent and laid the foundations for the unification of Europe. The next steps
of the enlargement process are mapped out. Bulgaria and Romania have already
signed accession treaties and will become members by 2007 or 2008. Negotiations
for Turkey’s accession to the EU commenced in October 2005, Croatia was given
the green light for accession negotiations in October 2005, and Macedonia was
granted candidate status in December 2005. Recent democratic transitions in
Ukraine and Georgia, as well as Moldova’s increased outreach toward the EU, may
pave the way for yet more candidate countries.
The European Union’s strategy of enlargement has clearly proven successful in
enhancing European stability and security. However, the French and Dutch rejec-
tions of the European Constitution have demonstrated that political will for further
enlargement is limited. Well before the constitutional debacle, Brussels recognised
the limitations to enlargement as a policy tool and established the European
Neighbourhood Policy as a means to promote stronger bonds beyond the borders
of an enlarged Union. This “everything but institutions”(Romano Prodi) approach
was welcomed by the EU’s neighbours, but it is not perceived by them as a suffi-
cient alternative to membership.
The “rainbow revolutions” in Russia’s “near abroad” demonstrated Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s inability to determine political developments in the
post-Soviet space of the Black Sea region. Putin’s unsuccessful strategy was based
on a combination of personalised networks and economic pressure. Despite the
increasingly problematic developments under Putin, Russia remains an important
actor in Europe as a whole. For the first time, Russia and the EU face the challenge
of shaping overlapping areas of integration. In order to meet this challenge and to
achieve its long-term interests, Russia must develop cooperative strategies that are
attractive to its Western partners and that uphold democratic principles.
The Balkans: Strengthening Institutional Bonds with the European Union
In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement, the desire to attain EU membership pro-
vided Central and Eastern European candidate countries with a powerful incentive
to establish democratic systems and adapt their economic and legal systems to
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European standards. Used strategically, the prospect of EU membership can serve
as an effective instrument for promoting stabilisation, reform, and development in
the Balkans as well. The most important preconditions for accession are spelled out
in concrete terms in the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process. To date, only
Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania have concluded a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with the EU, but the process is also moving forward in Serbia and
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as these two countries initiated SAA
negotiations in October 2005 and January 2006, respectively.
While the desire for EU membership boosts reform processes, democratically
oriented actors, and prospects for economic development in the Balkan countries
themselves, the EU and its member states also stand to benefit from the accession
of these countries to the EU. First, access to the EU’s internal market and structur-
al funds will contribute to the reduction of poverty and backwardness in the
Balkans. This in turn will protect EU member states against negative spillover
effects such as migration and organised crime. Second, the recent wars, as well as
decades of neglect during the era of state socialism, have left the Balkans in a state
of economic underdevelopment. Once these countries are irrevocably on a path
toward European integration, they are likely to experience longer-term economic
growth, which will also bring economic benefits to other EU member states.
In order to fully assess the potential benefits of Southeastern enlargement, one
must also take the economic, political, and security costs of non-enlargement, or a
long-term delay of enlargement, into account. If the EU’s internal problems cause
the accession of Balkan states to be postponed indefinitely, the status quo in the
region is likely to become unsustainable. Indeed, rather than the domestic prob-
lems of the Balkan states themselves, it may well be the internal troubles of the EU
that now present the greatest obstacle to the integration of the Western Balkans
into the Union. Enlargement fatigue, the crisis over the European Constitution,
ongoing disputes over internal institutional and budgetary reforms, and growing
public resistance to further rounds of enlargement have all contributed to a sense
of indirection and lack of leadership regarding the future shape of the EU. In order
to preserve the hard-fought gains that have been achieved in the Balkans and pre-
vent these states from slipping backwards, it is essential that European leaders
undertake the necessary steps to regain the political initiative and will to drive the
Southeastern enlargement process forward.
The “Everything but Institutions” Approach of European Neighbourhood Policy
While preparing for the historic 2004 round of enlargement, the European
Commission made a strategic decision to establish a new policy that would seek to
prevent the creation of a new dividing line within Europe after eight Central and
Eastern European states joined the Union. The European Neighbourhood Policy,
set forth in a Strategy Paper published in May 2004, envisages a “ring of friends,”
comprised of the EU’s neighbours in Eastern Europe as well as the states of the
Mediterranean littoral, around the European Union. Conceived as an alternative to
EU membership, the Policy offers wide-ranging forms of cooperation – including
the possibility of participating in the four freedoms of the EU’s single market, i.e.,
the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital – to neighbours ranging
from Egypt and Israel to Ukraine and the states of the Southern Caucasus. As part
of the Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commission produces detailed
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Country Reports that serve as the basis for tailor-made Action Plans with each
neighbour. The level of cooperation between the EU and each neighbour is deter-
mined by a differentiated, step-by-step process guided by specific criteria. Seven
Action Plans (with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority,
Tunisia and Ukraine) have been launched to date. Examples of objectives achieved
include progress by Ukraine in market reforms, visa facilitation, and energy issues,
as well as the establishment of a border assistance mission on the Moldovan–
Ukrainian border.
The European Neighbourhood Policy is an instrument that possesses considerable
potential for addressing the political, economic, and security challenges confront-
ing the EU and its neighbours. If it were implemented to its fullest extent, the
Policy would offer ambitious possibilities, such as visa-free travel from Kiev to Tel
Aviv, or a common European economic space without customs or trade barriers.
Because the proposal provides for bilateral neighbourhood treaties, the Union is
also able to tailor agreements to suit regional characteristics.
Despite its innovations, which should not be underestimated, the Neighbourhood
Policy was received sceptically by Black Sea states, particularly Ukraine. The gener-
al formulations presented in the proposal are not sufficiently attractive to offer a
real alternative to membership. With its strict criteria and evaluation benchmarks,
the Policy contains a set of “sticks” but lacks the budgetary and policy “carrots”
associated with membership prospects. In addition, by placing all of the EU’s eco-
nomically, politically, strategically, and culturally diverse neighbours within the
same policy framework, the Neighbourhood Policy is geared much more toward
the EU’s internal institutional needs than toward pan-European challenges. In re-
ality, the strategic priorities that shape EU relations with its Mediterranean neigh-
bours on one hand, and its eastern neighbours on the other, are significantly dif-
ferent. Because of its generalised formulation, the Neighbourhood Policy courts the
danger of being unable to provide an effective strategy toward either region’s
problems that serves the EU’s interests.
By anchoring the Neighbourhood Policy in the European Constitution, EU leaders
demonstrated their understanding that the elaboration of an effective neighbour-
hood strategy remains a key European challenge. However, the Union has yet to
develop a substitute instrument for enlargement that can provide effective support
to the latest wave of democratic aspirants in the Black Sea region.
Overlapping Integration Spaces between Russia and Euro-Atlantic Institutions
The fundamental transformation processes occurring in the Balkans and Black Sea
region have important – albeit different – consequences for Russia and the West,
respectively. On the one hand, grass-roots demands for free and fair elections in
these two regions reflect an embrace of Western values, and local actors under-
stand these demands as constituting a step towards Euro-Atlantic institutions,
particularly the EU and NATO. On the other hand, these democratic transitions
signify a rejection of President Putin’s strategy for promoting cooperation and
maintaining Russian influence throughout the post-Soviet landscape – a strategy
based on personalised influence and economic pressure. While the Balkans have
much more clearly entered the European orbit, the Black Sea has become a region
where Russian and Western interests and institutions increasingly overlap.
Russia: Seeking to
maintain influence
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Russian Policy
Strategic trajectories
Kempe · Klotzle · The Balkans and the Black Sea Region
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 2 · 2006 Page 13
As its influence over the former “Soviet empire”has declined – initially in the Baltic
States and other Central European countries, and most recently in Georgia and
Ukraine – Russia’s ruling elite has engaged in renewed efforts to regain leverage
over its direct neighbourhood. Russia’s interests in the Black Sea region differ from
those of the West. Given Moscow’s democratic shortcomings and personalised
decision-making structures, supporting democracy in its direct neighbourhood has
not been a priority. On the contrary, democratic elections in neighbouring states
represent a potential threat, a vehicle for shifting these states away from Russian
interests toward Western values and institutions. Thus, for Russian elites, elections
in the former Soviet space represent a means to maintain the Kremlin’s influence
in the region. For example, during recent elections in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Belarus, Russian officials have exploited personal networks and used public events
such as high-level meetings and campaign speeches in an attempt to influence
domestic political outcomes in its “near abroad”.
Moscow has also exercised economic pressure to influence political developments
in the Black Sea region, particularly in countries seeking to embrace Western
values and institutions. The recent dispute regarding prices of natural gas exports
from Russia to Ukraine provides an instructive example. In July 2004, in the run-
up to the Ukrainian presidential election between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor
Yanukovych, then-Prime Minister Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russia
whereby both sides agreed to heavily subsidised gas prices of approximately $50
per 1,000 cubic meters. Only a year later, Putin again sought to use Russian gas
price policy as a tool for exercising regional political influence. When the Ukrainian
government refused to agree to pay world market prices for Russian gas (approxi-
mately $230 per 1,000 cubic meters), Russia shut off gas exports to Ukraine on
1 January 2006 during a particularly harsh spell of winter weather.
The Kremlin has not yet developed a clear set of attractive objectives and policies
to promote cooperation in the post-Soviet space. A key challenge for Russian
policymakers will be to develop a comprehensive domestic and foreign policy that
takes democratic values and local interests into consideration. Given Russia’s own
internal security problems, reliance on increasingly autocratic and personalised
policies both domestically and abroad will not be sustainable in the long run.
4. The Balkans and the Black Sea: Strategic Options
Despite the pivotal position of the Balkans and Black Sea region as immediate
neighbours to the European Union, Russia, and NATO, these three key interna-
tional actors have so far failed to develop coherent strategies toward these regions.
Given their security risks, energy resources, and proximity to Asia and the Middle
East, however, the Balkans and Black Sea region present opportunities and
challenges that must be addressed. It is time for Europe, the United States, and
Russia to place a renewed and heightened focus on their policies in these regions.
Three distinct strategic trajectories present themselves.
Business as Usual
Given (a) the United States’present focus on the struggle against terrorism and the
troubled reconstruction effort in Iraq, (b) the EU’s enlargement hangover and pre-
occupation with internal institutional issues, and (c) Russia’s problematic relations
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with its Black Sea neighbours and its often conflicting interests with Western insti-
tutions, the most likely strategy toward the Balkans and Black Sea region may well
be “business as usual.”
This option encompasses three primary dimensions. First, the Balkans would con-
tinue on the path toward European integration, albeit with an unclear plan and
timetable. Second, apart from the EU accession and candidate states of Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, Black Sea states would remain subject to a multiplicity of
often contradictory policies that are largely bilateral in nature. Third, relations
between Russia and Euro-Atlantic institutions would be characterised by ongoing
vacillation between cooperation and confrontation, depending on the particular
issue.
While this (absence of) strategy may ultimately produce reasonable results, it also
contains considerable risks. First, if the EU’s internal quandaries lead to an indefi-
nite, drawn-out process of enlargement toward the Balkans, it is entirely possible
that democratic reformers in this region will lose traction and legitimacy, as frus-
trated citizens respond increasingly to the populist arguments of undemocratic,
nationalistic political actors. The EU simply cannot afford the security risks that
would emanate from a black hole of poverty and instability – containing the
distinct potential for renewed violent conflict – in the heart of Europe. Second, the
lack of a coherent and credible policy toward the Black Sea region could contrib-
ute to the perpetuation of destabilising frozen conflicts, the backsliding of demo-
cratic transformations that lack sufficient internal and external support, economic
underdevelopment and concomitant social unrest, and increasing energy insecuri-
ty. These risks are unsustainable in a region so close to the Middle East and Central
Asia, in a globalising world where security threats easily cross borders. Third, the
lack of a decisive and constructive Western policy toward Russia would give rise to
a similar set of risks, with the added problem of tensions that are likely to result
from competing “spheres of influence.”As a result, the disadvantages inherent in
“business as usual”make it imperative to examine other strategic options.
Intensified Engagement
The lack of a coherent strategy implied by “business as usual” not only contains
considerable risks, it also leaves the EU, Russia, and NATO playing primarily a
reactive role in the Balkans and Black Sea regions rather than proactively shaping
strategies to promote security, stability, and development that would benefit all
sides. A second policy option toward the Balkans and the Black Sea would there-
fore centre upon intensified engagement involving (a) a clearly formulated plan
and timetable for the accession of Western Balkan states into the EU and (b) a
more comprehensive policy to address the security, economic, and political needs
of the Black Sea region.
A Plan for Southeastern Enlargement
In the Balkans, the EU has a defined objective – EU membership for the Balkan
countries – but the roadmap toward this destination remains unclear. What would
happen if a coalition of interests favouring “association instead of membership”
were to form within the EU, while liberal reformers in the Balkan states lose
ground to populist and radical forces? This could result in a vicious circle of exclu-
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sion and instability. To prevent such a development, EU policymakers must not
leave the management of Balkan policy to bureaucrats but must actively shape the
integration process.
Organising the accession process in a strategic manner is crucial. This process
should be structured in transparent stages that are defined by clear conditions. In
addition, time horizons should be better aligned with the needs of domestic poli-
tical elites, in order to bolster the legitimacy of reform-oriented actors.
The EU should envisage EU membership for the year 2014 for Albania, Bosnia,
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo, as recently suggested by the
International Commission on the Balkans. This target date would reinforce the cre-
dibility of the accession process and provide local political elites and citizens with
a clear and transparent time frame for their own reform efforts. Accordingly, the
EU should define short- and medium-term benchmarks that can guide prepara-
tions for accession. These benchmarks should be elaborated in consultation with
Balkan governments and key local actors.
Since the overwhelming majority of citizens in the Western Balkan states favour
EU membership, a goal-oriented strategic dialogue that reaches beyond govern-
ment representatives should be initiated in order to boost support for the internal
reforms required by the accession process. Such a dialogue would reduce the
uncertainty that characterises the EU’s current stance on Southeastern enlarge-
ment, in which vague prospects of accession are loosely coupled to the fulfilment
of countless predetermined conditions that may multiply over time. This dialogue
would also overcome the rituals of conditionality, compliance, and refusal that
government-centred negotiation processes tend to produce.
Croatia will be able to fulfil the conditions for accession sooner than the other 
states in the Western Balkans, and Macedonia may also be ready for accession
before 2014. A state’s individual capabilities should determine the time of acces-
sion. Nevertheless, the shared, conflict-rich history of these states makes it
imperative to consider the regional dimension of each accession.
The most appropriate method for the strategic timing of the accession process
involves phased accession. This is based on the model of Bulgaria and Romania,
which were part of the accession negotiations with the other Central and Eastern
European states, but which will join the EU later due to their economic and admin-
istrative shortcomings. In concrete terms, this would mean that at the time Croatia
joins the EU, accession negotiations with Macedonia would be advancing and
those with other states would have begun. A phased accession process takes the
regional effects of each accession into account while respecting the principle of
individual capability. This type of process promises to maximise the positive
regional effects of enlargement, because the candidates that lag behind could, with
sufficient effort, benefit from the experiences of Croatia.
EU officials will also need to consider whether, in the interest of a more realistic
and efficient accession process, the fulfilment of certain conditions could be post-
poned until after accession. As with the 2004 enlargement round, accession nego-
tiations could be initiated even though most Balkan states will most likely be able
to fulfil only the economic and administrative criteria over the medium term.
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Strengthening a regional
approach to the Black Sea
Five components of an
improved EU policy
A Black Sea dimension?
The Black Sea Region: A Real Neighbourhood Policy
When Romania and Bulgaria join the European Union, the EU’s borders will
extend to the Black Sea, and the security, economic, and political risks of the Black
Sea region will officially become European problems. Despite the region’s growing
strategic importance, the EU has elaborated a policy for every neighbouring region
(for example, the Northern Dimension and the Barcelona Process) except the Black
Sea.
The agenda for the European Neighbourhood Policy must move beyond lip service
to goal-oriented cooperation. The EU should take its neighbours’European aspira-
tions seriously by providing tangible incentives and rewards for progress made
toward political and economic reforms. Generally, the EU should signal its open-
ness to all states that are willing and able to join the Union, while simultaneously
avoiding unrealistic expectations and the frustrations that result from them.
Thus the EU would be well advised to offer forms of cooperation that go beyond
the existing Neighbourhood Policy. The current “no”to EU membership should be
transformed into a “yes” to association. EU leaders should consider establishing
differentiated forms of association, including the possibility of membership in
individual areas of European cooperation and integration. Above all, it is important
to provide an expandable perspective that creates greater impetus for domestic
reforms.
In intensifying its engagement with the Black Sea region, the EU should focus on
the following issues:
1. The EU should make functional cooperation the main mechanism of the
Neighbourhood Action Plans. Fields such as energy and the development of
pan-European infrastructure are particularly relevant in this respect. Even
without prospects for EU membership, countries engaging in this type of coop-
eration can generate geographic and functional spillover effects that give rise to
an ever denser net of cooperation that may, in the most optimistic scenario,
result in the establishment of a European free-trade zone.
2. Regional cooperation is an important precondition for security and stability.
The European Union should initiate a Black Sea Dimension that critically incor-
porates the experiences gained through other regional frameworks such as the
Northern Dimension and the Barcelona Process. This Black Sea Dimension
should complement and promote, not replace, such important homegrown
regional initiatives as the Community of Democratic Choice or the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation.
3. In its own self-interest, the EU should support reform processes in the Black Sea
region by providing financial resources, training, and technical support. In particu-
lar, new EU member states’ experiences in implementing political and economic
reforms represent a valuable resource that should be passed on to the EU’s new
neighbours. A promising new financial instrument in this respect is the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), to be introduced in 2007,
which for the first time provides funding that can be used for projects both inside
and outside EU borders, including all countries in the Black Sea region.
NATO’s key role
Differentiated integration
Longer-term visions
of Europe
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4. The Common Foreign and Security Policy should address the Black Sea region
more effectively. Both the EU and Black Sea states have a mutual interest in
resolving regional security problems that have Europe-wide implications,
including festering conflicts, organized crime, terrorist activity, weapons prolif-
eration, and state fragility. A comprehensive foreign policy toward the Black Sea
region should also include issues such as energy security and the introduction
of an efficient visa policy.
5. As set forth in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU should maintain a
two-pronged evaluation process of its policy toward the Black Sea region. First,
the EU should evaluate progress made toward democratic and market-oriented
reforms, providing incentives and warnings in response. Second, the EU should
use these evaluations to adjust its policies to changing regional conditions and
priorities. Ensuring a transparent evaluation process will set up a framework for
cooperation that is understood by neighbouring countries.
Finally, NATO also has an important role to play in promoting stability in the Black
Sea region. Three countries bordering the Black Sea – Turkey, Romania, and
Bulgaria – are already NATO members. Ukraine, Croatia, and Azerbaijan all have
missions at NATO. In addition, the range of cooperative activities between NATO
and its neighbours has been developing rapidly. Given the EU’s current enlarge-
ment fatigue and NATO’s less demanding conditions for membership, NATO
could extend the embrace of democratic Western institutions in the Black Sea
region by offering membership prospects to the most interested Black Sea states,
such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
The EU’s intensified engagement with the Black Sea region should be viewed as
part of a controlled differentiation of the European Union. Only through differenti-
ated integration will the EU remain capable of further widening and deepening.
This does not mean the demise of the community method. Numerous examples of
differentiated integration already exist; the most prominent of these is the
Economic and Monetary Union, in which only 12 of 25 member states have adopt-
ed the Euro as their official currency. With neighbouring states and other interna-
tional actors making increasing demands upon European Union institutions, differ-
entiated integration is likely to be the key to ensuring democratic governance and
market-oriented growth in a wider and increasingly diverse Europe. This differen-
tiation, if offered to the Union’s neighbours through increased participation in EU
structures, will also be crucial to a policy that seeks to promote genuine reform and
cooperation while simultaneously avoiding new dividing lines in Europe.
A Pan-European Debate on Europe’s Future
While “intensified engagement” represents a desirable policy orientation toward
the current challenges in the Balkans and the Black Sea, European leaders and
their allies must continue to keep an eye on longer-term processes of European
integration, and the role of the Balkans and Black Sea region in future European
scenarios. Questions regarding the future shape of Europe, and regarding the
actors who will carry Europe forward, have arisen not only because the EU may be
reaching the limits of its ability to enlarge but also because of Europe’s internal cri-
sis of integration. These questions can be answered only through a far-reaching
debate that takes place in a framework transcending the confines of European
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and risk perceptions
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international partners
Union institutions. The goal is to increase the Union’s pan-European ability to act.
This debate must include Russia, not just as a neighbour but also as a foreign and
security policy actor. This discussion should also take place in consultation with,
and not in opposition to, the United States.
In this debate, institutional questions are less important than defining Europe’s
goals and perceptions of risks, and transforming these definitions into concrete
policies. The main European strategy statement in this regard is the European
Security Strategy, which lists five key threats that confront Europe in the 21st cen-
tury: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts,
state failure, and organised crime. Significantly, all of these threats are highly
applicable to both the Balkans and the Black Sea region, particularly the risks of
regional conflict, state failure, and organised crime. In addition, the recent crises
involving Russian gas supplies and social unrest among immigrant populations
(particularly in France and Denmark) have highlighted energy security, migration,
and the integration of cultural and religious minorities as increasingly important
issues affecting internal and external European security. Again, these risks are also
central to relations with the Balkans and Black Sea region. This overlap between
Europe’s perceived risks and their preponderance in Europe’s immediate neigh-
bourhood make it essential for the EU to strengthen its relations with the Balkans
and the Black Sea. How should these relations be structured to ensure long-term
stability and prosperity in these regions, and in Europe as a whole? What benefits
might EU membership – or some intensified form of association – for Ukraine or
the South Caucasus bring in spreading stability even beyond the Black Sea? Is
Turkey’s integration into the EU key for the creation of a bridge of stability con-
necting the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Middle East?
This debate must also focus on how the European Union must shape its relations
with key international partners in order to achieve its long-term goals as a pan-
European actor. NATO will be an essential partner in promoting stability through-
out the Euro-Atlantic community’s direct neighbourhood and in enhancing the
Western community of values. Russia’s importance as an economic and security
requires the formulation of a constructive EU policy toward Russia – one that
acknowledges Russian interests while making clear that these interests are best
served in the long term through the strengthening of democracy, transparency, and
civil society. The United States will remain an indispensable partner, and the EU
needs to both reinvigorate transatlantic relations while ensuring that interest-
driven transatlantic cooperation allows room for constructive disagreement among
close partners. Finally, the European Union’s commitment to effective multilateral-
ism demands increased cooperation and coordination with the United Nations as
well as vigilant support for reform efforts that will make the UN a more effective
and efficient international actor. Ultimately, the EU’s role as a credible partner with
NATO, Russia, the United States, and the United Nations puts the Union in a posi-
tion to function as a motor for promoting more coherent policies among all of
these actors in an increasingly integrated, interdependent Europe.
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5. Conclusion
In the globalising world of the 21st century, Europe, the United States, and Russia
certainly face no shortage of risks and challenges. International economic, politi-
cal, security, and humanitarian crises have placed increasing pressure on these
actors to become global players. Yet two of the most important challenges lie
directly on their doorstep. The Balkans and Black Sea region are key geopolitical
arenas where the critical issues of peace, security, democratisation, development,
and energy intersect, and instability in these regions will project instability into the
heart of the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia.
Important steps have been taken by both local and external actors to promote sta-
bility and prosperity in these regions. Yet the lack of clear-cut, coherent, and
sustainable policies toward these regions represents a strategic gap that must be
addressed. This paper has examined the key challenges and institutional linkages
that characterise the Balkans and the Black Sea region while suggesting policy
responses to address these problems and opportunities. The Euro-Atlantic com-
munity and Russia – and particularly the European Union – must now find modes
of decisive and constructive cooperation, both amongst each other as well as with
local actors, in order to continue making progress toward a Europe whole and free.
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